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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PIaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870447-CA

v.
RANDY OWEN PRICE,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Aggravated Assault,
a third degree felony, after a trial in the Fifth Judicial
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendants

motion for a new trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) (1982).
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Randy Owen Price, was charged with
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978).

Defendant was convicted of

Aggravated Assault in a jury trial held July 17, 1987 in the
Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State of

Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding.

On

September 15, 1987, defendant was sentenced by Judge Eves to
serve a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of March 7, 1987 at about llsOO p.m.,
defendant attended a college party with his wife, Melinda Price,
and their friends Larry Gore, Donna Gore and Kim Codebo (T.
159).1

The victim, Mike LaPour, arrived with his friends soon

thereafter (T. 43)• For a nominal cover charge, party guests
could drink all the beer and "animal punch" they desired (T. 62).
Donna Gore, who had become heavily intoxicated and
argumentative, began yelling at the Mr. LaPour and tossed some
beer on him (T. 170-72).

The arguing continued until both Gore

and LaPour were ejected from the party (T. 99-100).

LaPour1s

friend, Kelly Edwards, escorted him to his pickup truck (T. 100).
Gore followed and continued to taunt LaPour by tossing stones at
his truck (T. 100).
Soon after, defendant and Kim Codebo appeared and
joined Gore (T. 101). Codebo produced a gun, approached the
passengers side of the truck where LaPour was seated, and ordered
Edwards to back away from the truck (T. 102-04).

As Edwards

backed away, Codebo put the gun barrel to the victim's head and
said "you ainft so bad now" (T. 105-06).
Edwards moved towards Codebo saying, "knock it off,"
but was again ordered at gunpoint to back away (T. 106).

1 «T« refers to the Trial Transcript dated July 17, 1987.
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Defendant approached LaPour in the doorway of the truck, jumped
on top of him, and began a struggle (T. 106). Meanwhile, Gore
was standing nearby screaming, "cut him" (T. 107). Defendant
pulled a knife and cut LaPour across the chest and arm (T. 51) .
Just then, a car approached and the attackers fled (T. 106-07).
Edwards immediately ran over to LaPour where he observed blood on
LaPour1s arm and chest (T. 107). He then drove LaPour to the
hospital for treatment (T. 106-07).
The next morning, police officers arrested defendant at
a nearby motel and found a blood-stained pocket knife in his
possession (T. 139-43, 151). Defendant admitted to the officers
that he had been involved in a fight at the college party (T.
145)•

Codebo was also arrested with a loaded Colt .45 automatic

tucked in his waistband

(T. 126-28).
SUMMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a new trial where the alleged new evidence consisted of
cumulative impeachment evidence which was immaterial considering
the totality of the evidence.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant his motion for a new trial.

Specifically,

defendant claims that the newly discovered testimony of Diana
Hunt justified a new trial.

Ms. Hunt, a co-worker of defendant's

wife, signed a post-trial affidavit claiming that LaPour had told
-3-

her that he was stabbed by a "black guy at a party."

(See

Appendix "A"*)
A motion for new trial is governed by Rule 24(a) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-24(a) (1982).
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "the
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of that discretion.
(Utah 1985).

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222

The Court has further explained that it is a

"matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence."
1973).

State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438, 439 (Utah

A trial court's decision "will be deemed an abuse of

discretion only in such instances where there is a grave
suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of the
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new evidence
will supply;"

I£. at 439-40.

In other words, "[i]f there be

evidence before the court upon which reasonable men might differ
as to whether or not the defendant is guilty, the trial court may
deny a motion for a new trial."

1&. at 440.

Three criteria must be met in a motion for a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

These are:

(1) that

the evidence is material and newly discovered, (2) that using due
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diligence it could not have been discovered prior to trial, and
(3) that the evidence is substantial enough that, with itf there
might have been a different result.

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617

P.2d 369f 372 (Utah 1980).
In the present caser the new evidence consisted of a
prior inconsistent statement of the victim.

(See Addendum "A".)

Such evidence merely goes to the credibility of the victim and
the weight to be afforded his testimony.

Impeachment evidence is

generally considered insufficient to warrant a new trial.

Moore

V, Illinois* 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. Meyers. 534
F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

In Meyers, the court held that:

Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to
impeach the credibility of a prosecution
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to
justify a new trial, . • . particularly when
the newly discovered evidence would be "only
an additional part of a cumulative attack on
a witness1 credibility."
Meyers, 534 F.Supp. at 756 (citations omitted) quoting. United
States Vt gilbert* 668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981) cert. &£ai£L&r 456

u.s. 946 (1982).

££& also, Mesarosh y. United gtatesr 352 u.s.

1, 9 (1956) .
At trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach the
victim by pointing out prior inconsistent statements from his
preliminary hearing testimony (T. 71). Following the Meyers
rationale, this court should find that the new impeachment
evidence is merely cumulative and insufficient to justify a new
trial.
In addition, the newly discovered evidence is
insubstantial, immaterial and unlikely to produce a different
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result when compared to the totality of the evidence.

In its

order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court found
that:
the proposed testimony of Diana L. Hunt as
contained in he proffered affidavit would not
have had any impact on the outcome and the
omission thereof from the trial would not
have a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of the Defendant herein, for the
reason that there was no testimony at the
time of the trial that the "black guy" was
anywhere near the pick-up truck where the
crime occurred, and the most credible witness
of all was Mr. Edwards who, not being under
the influence of any alcohol, testified
clearly and convincingly that he placed Mr.
Lopour inside the truck, that Mr. Lopour had
no injuries at that time, that he then saw
the Defendant enter the truck or make furtive
movements through the open truck door toward
Mr. Lopour, and that immediately thereafter,
Mr. Edwards saw Mr. Lopour bleeding.
(See Appendix "B".)

Additionally, the police officer's testified

that defendant possessed a knife and Codebo a gun when they were
arrested

(T. 126-27, 141-42).

Defendant also admitted having

been in a fight at the party (T. 145).
In light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant
and the immateriality of the newly discovered evidence, the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's Motion
for a New Trial.

•6-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY, submitted this & (~- day of April, 1988,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to James L. Shumate, Attorney for Defendant, 110 North Main
Street, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this
day of April, 1988.
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APPENDIX A

JAMES L. SHUMATE
Attorney for Defendant
110 North Main Street
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone (801) 586-3772
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
i
]|

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
MOTION FOR NEW TRIA

vs.
RANDY OWEN PRICE,
i

Criminal No. 1123

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH # )
:ss.
County of Iron )
Diana L. Hunt being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am an adult female resident of Iron County, State

of Utah, over the age of 18 years and competent to testify as to
the matters set forth hereinafter from personal knowledge.
2.

I personally know one Mike LaPour, the victim in

the above-entitled case and have known him since 1983.
3.

At a home in Cedar City approximately 2 \ eeks after

Mike LaPour was injured I had a conversation with him.

During

this conversation I informed Mr. LaPour that I had heard that he
had been stabbed at a party.

Mr. LaPour responded that he had

been stabbed at a party and then pulled up his shirt to diplay a
scar on his chest and also displayed a scar on his forearm.

0123

Mr. LaPour then told we that he had been stabbed by Ma black guy
at a party".
4.

I had been unaware that the above-named Defendant

Randy Price was being charged or tried for an assault upon Mike
LaPour and learned of this only after discussing the case with
Mrs. Price at the American Siesta Motel where we both work.

I

did not weet Mrs. Price until after the trial of Randy Price.
DATED this

I^

day of Augrrrt-r—1987 .
}

t<X4ifl, ./.

/{tCStf-

DIANA L. HUNT

.s£

Subscribed and sworn to before we this _/

day of

tagTOt, 1987.

NOTARY ^UBElC
>^Resid
iding at:.

Cedar City, Utah

My Commission Expires:

0130

APPENDIX B

«1

KEITH F. OEHLER
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
95 North Main, Suite #22
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

])
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

1

vs.
RANDY OWEN PRICE,

]>

District Court No.

112J"

Defendant.
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 15th day of
September, 1987, prior to the imposition of sentence herein.

The

State of Utah was represented by Keith F. Oehler, Chief Deputy
Iron County Attorney, and the Defendant was present in person and
represented by his Counsel, James L. Shumate, Esq,
the arguments of Counsel, the Court
testimony

of

Diana

L. Hunt

Having heard

finds that the proposed

as contained

in her

proffered

affidavit would not have had any impact on the outcome and the
omission thereof

from the trial would

not have a substantial

adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant herein, for the
reason that there was no testimony at the time of the trial that
the "black guy" was anywhere near the pick-up truck where the
crime occurred, and the most credible witness of all was Mr.
Edwards who, not being
testified

under

the

clearly and convincingly

influence of any alcohol,
that he placed Mr. Lopour

013*

inside the truck, that Mr. Lopour had no injuries at that time,
that he then saw the Defendant enter the truck or make furtive
movements through the open truck door toward Mr. Lopour, and that
immediately thereafter, Mr. Edwards saw Mr. Lopour bleeding.
THEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is hereby
denied.

~

DATED this

September, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

J . ^ H I L I P EVES
D i s t r i c t Court (fludge
APPROVED a s t o form and
content t h i s
day
of September, 1987:

JhHtS L. SHUMATE
/ A t t o r n e y for Defendant

-2-

0*

